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Response to Gillian Lester and Stewart J.
Schwab: An Indiana Perspective
WILuAM R. GROTH"
Litigation over restrictive employment covenants normally does not involve
statutory construction. Thus, the judicial task has evolved into the use of a
reasonableness test and the often uncritical application of certain legal principles,
some of which are of considerable vintage, in deciding whether to enforce a particular
restriction. Those who seek objectivity and predictability in adjudication find
troublesome the application of such broad judicial discretion as is inherent whenever
a court makes a judgment that a restriction is or is not "reasonable."
Professor Gillian Lester's thoughtful discussion explores the question of whether
and when courts should enforce restrictive covenants and the economic
considerations that should, but often do not, inform their judgments. She is
particularly critical of the judiciary's unwillingness to enforce covenants not to
compete that are designed to protect an employer's often costly investment in the
training of its human resources. And she explores alternative approaches courts could
employto protect those investments, concluding that most are, unfortunately, in some
way or other flawed or unmanageable!1
The courts in Indiana are highly suspicious of restrictive employment covenants
and will examine them closely to determine whether they are reasonably limited in
temporal and geographic scope and whether they seek to protect legally protectible
interests in trade secrets, customer lists, or other confidential proprietary information.
Indiana courts are loathe to restrain the use of skills or information gained by an
employee in the course of his employment.2 In other states, Illinois for example, the
analysis of whether a particular employer interest is protectible focuses on whether
the customer or client relationships for which protection is sought are "near-
permanent," which in large part turns on the nature of the business involved.3
Restrictions on future employment, particularly those not included in an employment
contract guaranteeing employment for a specified term, are judicially disfavored
because they are perceived as lacking in consideration and they operate to restrain the
employee from using the skills gained in the course of his employment, thereby
constituting a restraint on competition in contravention of the perceived public
interest.
Lester is undoubtedlyright in characterizing the reasonableness test as frustratingly
imprecise.4 She is also correct in criticizing the questionable analysis in cases such
as Brunner v. Hand Industries, Inc.,5 which do not adequately take into account the
* Partner, Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth & Towe.
1. Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of
Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.L 49, 51-53 (2001).
2. McGlothamv. Heritage Environmental Services, L.L.C., 705 N.E.2d 1069,1072 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999) (citing Century Personnel, Inc. v. Brummett, 499 N.E.2d 1160, 1163 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986).
3. E.g., Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Res. Group, 685 N.E.2d 434,443-
44 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
4. Lester, supra note 1, at 56-57.
5. 603 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
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often substantial employer investments in training and the societal benefits of such
nonconfidential training.'
There are some early signs that the longstanding judicial hostility to covenants may
be on the wane, no doubt in part due to the critical analysis of academics, such as
Professor Lester, and prominent jurists, such as Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh
Circuit. In a decision handed down last year, Posner, in dissent, stated that he sees no
reason for continued judicial hostility to restrictive employment covenants, which he
views as legitimate methods of protecting an employer's investment in training of its
employees.7 Posner does not believe the judiciary should continue to scrutinize such
covenants to determine whether they serve a "social purpose," an approach he views
as inconsistent with the freedom to contract.8 He would deny enforcement of
restrictive employment covenants only in rare instances, and then only by invoking
the doctrines of fraud, duress, or unconscionability in cases of perceived abuses.9
My practice is confined to representing labor organizations and individual workers,
so I seldom find myself involved in the frequent restrictive covenant disputes
involving professionals or more highly compensated managerial or technical
employees. Those few occasions when I have encountered restrictive covenants have
arisen in the construction industry in which much of my practice is concentrated.
In the construction industry, unions nowadays seek to convince nonunion craft
employees to cross over to work for union contractors during periods of tight labor
markets, a tactic known as "stripping." Some nonunion contractors have fought back
by using restrictive employment covenants. One nonunion contractor, in response to
efforts by a union to organize his employees, offered to make his key craftspeople
equity owners in a new company he had formed. Each employee would pay $1000
as an initial capital investment in the new company. The owner agreed to loan any
employee the $1000 initial capital investment, and to forgive the loan after a specified
period of time, but only if the employee would agree to sign a covenant not to go to
work for any competing contractor for two years after termination. The covenant,
which was not included in an employment contract guaranteeing employment for a
specified term, also contained a section requiring the worker to pay the contractor's
attorney fees in the event the worker brought an unsuccessful enforcement action
against him. One can only hope that this use of a restrictive covenant would be
doomed by the doctrine of unconscionability or duress.
One novel way unions in the construction trades have used restrictive covenants
offensively is by requiring apprentices, prior to their indenturement, to execute what
are called Scholarship Loan Agreements ("SLAs"). Under these agreements,
apprenticeship programs funded by Taft-Hartley trusts require a would-be apprentice
to sign a loan agreement and a promissory note under which he or she agrees to repay
6. Lester, supra note 1, at 67- 68; see Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 947 (7th
Cir. 1994); see also, Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to
Compete, 10 J. LEGALSTuD. 93, 96-97 (1981). However, I believe the court reached the right
decision because the covenant was unconscionable and not supported by adequate
consideration.
7. Outsource Int'l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.
dissenting).
8. Id. at 672.
9. Id. at 670-72.
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the substantial cost of apprenticeship training, by working for a specified period
(usually ten years) only for employers who contribute to the apprenticeship training
trust fund. The loan is then reduced proportionately each year the former apprentice,
now journeyman, continues to work for signatory contractors. If, following
acquisition of journeyman status, the apprentice accepts craft employment with a
nonsignatory employer, the apprenticeship trustees are authorized by the SLA to sue
for repayment of the balance owed. In 1995, the Seventh Circuit held that such loan
agreements are enforceable in federal court under Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.0 SLAs do not suffer from the infirmities of other restrictive
employment covenants, the court held, because they do not prevent the journeyman
from working within a geographic area or in a certain industry. " Instead, they simply
impose upon the apprentice an obligation to repay the cost of training if he or she
breaches the commitment.' The court viewed these agreements as similar to
government-f'manced student loans with compulsory public-service requirements.
These agreements have gone far in discouraging the opportunistic recruitment of
newly trained journiymen, thereby protecting the industry's investment in this
valuable human capital. 3
Lastly, any attorney practicing in the area of restrictive employment
covenants should read District Judge David F. Hamilton's opinion last year in
Bridgestone/Firestone v. Lockhart.4 In Lockhart, Hamilton not onlyheld a restrictive
employment covenant to be overbroad and unenforceable, he also entered judgment
in favor of the defendant employee on his counterclaim under the Indiana blacklisting
statute'Sand assessed the employer $50,000 in compensatory damages for attempting,
through the device of an overbroad restrictive covenant, to prevent the former
employee from obtaining employment with another employer.' 6 To my knowledge
this decision is the first time that a court in Indiana has found an employer's
attempted enforcement of an overbroad restrictive covenant to violate the Indiana
statute prohibitingblacklisting, which was passed in the late Nineteenth century when
Eugene V. Debs was busily organizing the nation's railway workers.
Turning to Professor Stewart Schwab's discussion on employment law in the
future, I acknowledge, as does he, the futility and thanklessness of predicting future
trends in the law.'7 The pace of change throughout our society is accelerating almost
beyond our ability to comprehend it. Technological and scientific breakthroughs have
created whole new industries with a different breed of workers, many of whom have
unconventional attitudes about work. However, most workers today have the same
concerns, fears, and anxieties that workers have always had. Today, more than ever,
workers want training for the skills they will need to compete in the globalized
10. Milwaukee Area Joint Apprenticeship Training Comm. for the Elec. Indus. v. Howell,
67 F.3d 1333, 1337 (7th Cir. 1995).
11. Id. at 1339.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1339-40.
14. 5 F. Supp. 2d 667 (S.D. Ind. 1998); see also Lester, supra note 1, at 57 n.37.
15. IND. CODE §§ 22-5-3-2 to -3 (1998).
16. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 687-88.
17. StewartJ. Schwab, Predictingthe FutureofEmployment Law: ReflectingorRefracting
Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29,29-31 (2001).
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economy. They are anxious about the lack- of job security. They share an
apprehension about the erosion of privacy in their workplaces. Workers, particularly
those with families, fret over their inability to find time to nurture their children and
to have flexibility to balance the competing demands of family and work. Workers
feel an increasing need to become self-sufficient, and yearn fora greater voice in their
workplaces.
Like Schwab, I am not optimistic there are significant changes in employment law
on the immediate horizon beneficial to the multitude of workers who do not belong
to unions or who do not possess high-tech skills or advanced degrees. 8 I would argue
that the failure of employment law to keep pace with technological and demographic
changes will have long-term deleterious effects not only for workers, but also for the
economy as a whole, as talented workers, many of them female, leave a workforce
perceived by them as hostile or unsympathetic to their desires for such basics as
quality child care and health care.
What are the prospects that workers' concerns will be addressed either by
legislative enactment or extension of the common law? Given the fact that Congress
and many state legislative bodies are now firmly in the grip of the monied interests
and are largely dysfunctional, 9 I am less than optimistic that the next decade will see
much in the way of legislation addressing the needs of the next generation ofworkers.
For example, despite the concerns over increasing intrusions upon workers' privacy,
Congress was recently unable even to agree on a modest bill providing some
substantive protection for the privacy of workers' medical records.20 In Indiana, the
only law I am aware of in the past decade which expanded workers' privacy rights
was a bill, shepherded through the state legislature by the tobacco industry a few
years ago," which prohibits employers from discharging workers who use tobacco
products away from work.' Efforts to advance privacy interests through novel uses
of the common law have fallen victimto the federal judiciary's aggressive invocation
of the doctrine of section 301 preemption,23 where the employees are part of a
collective bargaining unit.24 The only significant recent progress in protecting
workers' privacy interests has been at the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"
or "Board"), which in 1997 held that electronic monitoring of union-represented
18. See id. at 34, 46-48.
19. See Soft Money and the Political Parties: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Rules
and Administration, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Scott Harshberger, President and CEO
of Common Cause), 2000 WL 381314 (F.D.C.H.).
20. Health Care PIN Act of 1998, S. 1921, 105th Cong. (1998); see also Joyce Friedan,
Medical Records Privacy Bills Mired in Politics, 30 SKIN & ALLERGY NEws 53
(June 1999), available at http://news.medscape.com/IMNG/SkinAllergyNews/l999/v30.n06/
san3006.53.01.html.
21. IND. CODE § 22-5-4-1 to -4. (1998). The assertion that this bill was actually promoted
and lobbied for by the tobacco interests is from my personal observations of the General
Assembly.
22. Id.
23. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
24. See, e.g., Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir.
1993).
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workers must be bargained over with the employees' collective representative.' I
agree with Schwab that the increase in the number of women in the workforce may
be the best hope for changes in employment law.26 This phenomenon was perhaps one
of the catalysts for the only significant pro-employee piece of federal employment
legislation this decade, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA") 7
Demographic changes in the composition of the workforce may portend an eventual
expansion of the FMLA to cover many more employers and employees than it
currently does, and amendments to provide for paid rather than unpaid time off, as
is provided for in similar laws in Europe.' Recent legislative effort in this regard has
focused on allowing workers on FMLA-qualifying leaves of absence to receive
unemployment benefits.29 Pressure may also continue to build for a strengthened
Equal Pay Act3° to combat the still significant earnings disparity between male and
female workers."
With Congress paralyzed and wallowing in the mud of special interest money, the
demands of increasingly competitive labor markets are causing some employers to
respond to worker needs and concerns in the absence of legislative mandates.
Competition for workers is presently so fierce that even bottom-end employers now
find it necessary to promise retirement benefits and offer health insurance options in
order to attract and keep qualified workers. On the other hand, the competitive labor
market has yet to make a dent in the increasing income disparities between rich and
poor, or to make any significant inroads into the ever growing number of workers
without health insurance. As Frank Levy, an economist at MIT and an author of two
books on the income gap recently stated: "Markets are obviously very important in
the economy, but they are surrounded by a lot of rules-rules about how easy it is to
organize unions and how free trade is-and those rules are determined by the political
process, which is now shaped by money [donated to political campaigns]." '32
Schwab observes that employment law can serve as a buffer against the harshest
aspects of market forces.3 But for the foreseeable future, globalization and the
increasing influence by the managerial class over legislative bodies will continue to
act as a brake on the enactment of employment-law changes which expand worker
rights and protections.
25. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 515, 516 (1997).
26. See Schwab, supra note 17, at 46.
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
28. E.g., CHiLD CARE, PARENTAL LEAVE, AND THE UNDER 3S: PoLIcY INNOVATION IN
EUROPE, (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds., 1991).
29. See, e.g., Family Income to Respond to Significant Transitions Insurance Act, H.R.
2500, 106th Cong. (1999).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 206(b) (1994).
31. See, e.g., Lindley H. Clark, Jr., Speaking ofBusiness: The Pay Gap Narrows-Slowly,
WALLST. J., July 2, 1993, at A6:4. In a 1991 analysis, Diane Crispell reported that the greatest
salary gap between men and women occurs with managerial positions, where women receive
only sixty-one percent of the salaries received by men in similar positions. Diane Crispell,
Women's Earnings Gap Is Closing-Slowly, AM. DEMOGRAPfIcs, Feb. 1991, at 14.
32. FRANK LEVY, THE NEW DoLLARs AND DREAMs (1998).
33. See Schwab, supra note 17, at 33.
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